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On Scientific Research: The Role of Statistical Modeling and Hypothesis Testing 
 
 
 
Lisa L. Harlow 
University of Rhode Island 
 
 
Comments on Rodgers (2010a, 2010b) and Robinson and Levin (2010) are presented. Rodgers (2010a) 
initially reported on a growing trend towards more mathematical and statistical modeling; and a move 
away from null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). He defended and clarified those views in his 
sequel. Robinson and Levin argued against the perspective espoused by Rodgers and called for more 
research using experimentally manipulated interventions and less emphasis on correlational research and 
ill-founded prescriptive statements. In this response, the goal of science and major scientific approaches 
are discussed as well as their strengths and shortcomings. Consideration is given to how their recent 
articles intersect or differ on these points. A summary and suggestions are provided regarding how to 
move forward with scientific inferences. 
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Introduction 
The Focus of Science 
The study and practice of science is 
complex and encompasses various approaches 
and  methods.  Central  to  all of  science  is  the 
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search for basic principles from which 
phenomena can be explained and predicted. 
How are the underlying tenets - the golden 
nuggets of truth - in a scientific field discovered 
and illuminated? That is one of the main 
questions of this commentary. 
Herbert Simon (1969), a Nobel Laureate 
in economics and a noted cognitive 
psychologist, believed that whereas human 
behavior is inherently simple, the complexity of 
the environment in which the behavior occurs 
can prevent or obscure human understanding of 
the basic processes. Thus, Simon (1969) viewed 
the main focus of science as finding the 
simplicity in the complexity of life. 
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Four decades later, Michio Kaku (2009), 
a theoretical physicist and an advocate of 
making science understandable, reached a 
conclusion that was not far afield from Simon. 
Kaku made a comparison with the basic rules of 
chess and the actual enactment of a multitude of 
different possible chess games, elaborating that 
“the rules of nature may also be finite and 
simple, but the applications of those rules may 
be inexhaustible. Our goal is to find the rules.” 
(p. 302). Kaku elucidated that the development 
and testing of basic principles in science 
“reveals the ultimate simplicity and harmony of 
nature at the fundamental level” (pp. 302-302), 
and that testing in science is most often indirect. 
As a result, it may be more productive to have 
multiple and varied ways to approach research 
and inferences in order to arrive at the most 
salient, underlying, and often latent, truths. 
Consistent with the perspective that 
scientific understanding is not always directly 
observable, George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez 
(2000) emphasized the importance of concepts 
and analogies in what they call “the 
metaphorizing capacity” (p. 54) for 
understanding and applying quantitative 
methods beyond simple arithmetic and counting. 
These researchers realized the value of 
considering how a phenomenon is similar to, 
and different from, other related quantifiable 
observations. In a comparable view, Brian 
Hayes (2011) wrote that by breaking down 
stimuli into small segments and noticing points 
of contrast and similarity the most salient 
aspects are revealed. He summarized this 
process by stating that “the aim is to explore the 
kinds of patterns that appear frequently in our 
environment, in the hope of identifying and 
understanding some characteristic themes or 
features” (p. 422). 
Another perspective was offered by Paul 
Rozin (2009) who discussed how published and 
funded research has tended, perhaps mistakenly, 
to involve results engendered through 
hypothesis-testing, controlled experiments and 
building causal evidence. In contrast, Rozin 
recommended descriptive or other kinds of 
studies that may have more external validity in 
varied, real-world settings. Rozin ventured that, 
“Elegance and clarity are criteria for publication, 
but there should be a trade-off with novelty and 
engagement” (2009, p. 437); and further that “a 
really interesting study with a flaw may be more 
valuable than a flawless but uninteresting study” 
(p. 438). 
Stefan Hoffmann (2011) suggested that 
scientific curiosity is fed by having a great deal 
of background knowledge about a phenomenon, 
and then noticing anomalies, developing 
intuitions and finding connections. It is at the 
intersection of novelty, uncertainty and 
understanding that brings about scientific 
curiosity and discovery. Toby Huff (2011) 
concurred, speaking of how engaging curiosity 
and overarching synthesis lead to scientific 
discovery. 
Culling together the perceptions of these 
and other astute thinkers, what appear to be 
integral for scientific discovery are the inquiring, 
understanding, seeking, describing, comparing 
and testing of credible and innovative ideas and 
relationships that may initially be difficult to 
discern; and the potential to assess the import 
and generalizability of findings with rigorous 
methodological procedures. I would argue that 
the methods espoused by Robinson and Levin, 
and Rodgers incorporate much of these elements 
of scientific discovery, albeit with differing 
approaches. 
 
Approaches to Scientific Research 
A reasonable question to ask is how scientific 
research should be approached. To accomplish 
scientific development and discovery, Simonton 
(2003) argued that it is important to see 
connections among diverse situations and 
processes, as well as to have an experimental, 
problem solving approach. Cronbach (1957) 
spoke to this seeming duality when discussing 
the two disciplines of psychology that involved 
either a correlational or an experimental focus. 
Each of these researchers is featuring two 
valuable, although often divergent, aspects of 
innovative science: naturalistic flexibility and 
rigorous control. This apparent dichotomy can 
also be viewed as striving for broad, 
generalizable external validity, versus strict and 
controlled internal validity; objectives endorsed 
in varying degrees by the Rodgers, and 
Robinson and Levin articles, respectively. 
Although there are probably as many approaches 
to scientific investigation as there are 
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researchers, two major methods - null hypothesis 
significance testing and (correlational) statistical 
modeling - are the main focus of this 
commentary. 
 
Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
The traditional approach to research, 
null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), is 
supported by Robinson and Levin, and 
minimized but recognized by Rogers. Briefly, 
NHST centers on an attempt to reject a null 
hypothesis of no notable import (e.g., two means 
are equal, a correlation is zero) and thereby 
attempting to build evidence for an alternate 
hypothesis that claims a significant difference or 
relationship. A noted benefit of NHST is that 
researchers can clearly specify null and alternate 
hypotheses and can calculate the probability of 
obtaining sample results as extreme or more so 
than are achieved in a relevant and randomly 
collected sample. Thus, if the probability, or p-
value, is less than a designated level (e.g., 0.05), 
researchers can conclude that there is very little 
chance of obtaining the sample results found if 
the null hypothesis is true in the larger 
population from which the sample was drawn. 
This is particularly helpful if a decision is 
needed as to whether a specific treatment or 
intervention should be pursued as a viable 
option, after conducting a rigorous experiment 
that had adequate power to detect a significant 
finding and involved satisfactory design (e.g., 
random selection and assignment) to rule out 
possible rival hypotheses or confounds. 
Devlin (1998) agreed, pointing out how 
probability theory is useful when it is necessary 
to make crucial decisions about whether to 
endorse a particular treatment or intervention. 
NHST would be helpful in this regard when 
there is a need to come to a decision about 
rejecting a null hypothesis with a specified 
probability. Others also attested to the benefits 
of NHST. Mulaik, Raju and Harshman (1997) 
stated that “as long as we have a conception of 
how variation in results may be due to chance 
and regard it as applicable to our experience; we 
will have a need for significance tests in some 
form or another” (p. 81). Chow (1996) and 
Cortina and Dunlap (1997), among others, also 
applauded the advantage of using NHST to rule 
out a chance finding in research. 
Nonetheless, NHST has been 
extensively discussed and debated by Robinson 
and Levin, as well as Rodgers, and in numerous 
other forums (e.g., Balluerka, Gómez & 
Hidalgo, 2005; Denis, 2003; Harlow, Mulaik & 
Steiger, 1997; Kline, 2004; Nickerson, 2000). 
The better part of criticism regarding NHST 
appears to center on the exclusive focus of the p-
value from a statistical test, and the 
accompanying dichotomizing decision to reject 
or retain the null hypothesis. Cumming (2012) 
has spoken at length on the volubility of p-
values and the practice of NHST. Rice and 
Trafimow (2010) would likely agree with 
Cumming in arguing for less concern over Type 
I errors (i.e., rejecting a null hypothesis when the 
null hypothesis should not be rejected), and 
more attention to Type II errors, which refer to 
the failure to reject a null hypothesis when the 
alternate, scientific hypothesis may actually 
have more merit. 
Noteworthy is that most, if not all, of the 
proponents and critics of NHST would also 
promote the use of additional substantiation over 
and above, or instead of, evidence of a 
significant p-value. Robinson and Levin 
advocated for correct applications of statistical 
hypothesis testing that involve randomized 
experiments, attention to Types I and II errors, 
effect sizes and sample size considerations, as 
well as the use of confidence intervals. Rodgers 
in turn played down hypothesis testing in favor 
of what he claimed is a broader, more 
subsuming and organic modeling approach that 
has emerged in an almost imperceptible 
methodological revolution. Before discussing 
the statistical modeling endorsed by Rogers and 
eschewed by Robinson and Levin, it is 
worthwhile to mention the merits of 
complementary procedures to help corroborate 
research findings. 
 
Supplementing NHST 
Any acknowledged advantages of 
NHST notwithstanding, current guidelines and 
research call for additional evidence when 
making scientific inferences. The recent 6th 
edition of the American Psychological 
Association (APA: 2010) publication manual 
“stresses that NHST is but a starting point and 
that additional reporting elements such as effect 
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sizes, confidence intervals, and extensive 
description are needed...” (p. 33); this viewpoint 
is consistent with that from Robinson and Levin 
as well as Rodgers and others. 
Seven years before the APA guidelines, 
Denis (2003) presented a balanced overview of 
NHST and several possible alternatives. Denis 
suggested that the use of model testing among 
two or more reasonable alternatives, using good-
enough hypotheses, calculating effect sizes and 
confidence intervals, and providing graphical 
displays of the findings are all effective and 
viable alternatives or supplements to NHST. 
Neither Rogers nor Robinson and Levin would 
be likely to take issue with much of this 
suggestion. 
Others call for establishing or 
replicating a finding before it is accepted. 
Sawilowsky (2003) cautioned that effect sizes 
should not be widely published if they are not 
statistically significant. Filkin (1997) stated that 
“science seeks to separate fact from fiction by 
finding evidence” (p. 16); and that “for an idea 
or theory to be accepted as scientifically proven, 
it has to be tested in such a way that it can be 
tested over and over again and the result must 
always confirm the theory” (p. 20). Carl Sagan 
(1997) would have agreed with the need for 
replication; he wrote that the only way to find 
answers to “deep and difficult questions … [is] 
by real, repeatable, verifiable observations” (p. 
63). Robinson and Levin aptly encouraged 
conducting “independent replications” to verify 
whether a significant finding is reliable, a 
practice also backed by Rodgers. 
Consistent with replication, Wilson 
(1998) affirmed that “scientific evidence is 
accretionary, built from blocks of evidence 
joined artfully by the blueprints and mortar of 
theory … as evidence piles upon evidence and 
theories interlock more firmly, certain bodies of 
knowledge do gain universal acceptance” (p. 
64). Wilson further highlighted the need for 
“improving the piecemeal approach science has 
taken to its material properties” (p. 66). Here, 
Wilson argued for a multivariate approach, as 
well as more attention to strong theory to ground 
scientific research. In this issue of the Journal of 
Modern Applied Statistical Methods, the value 
of theory was touted by Rodgers as well as 
Robinson and Levin; however, the usefulness of 
multivariate methodology was championed by 
the former but discouraged by the latter 
researchers. 
It is also of interest that discussion about 
the need to augment NHST is not limited to the 
topic of abstract methodology, but rather 
intersects with the content and substance of 
practice and research. In a recent issue of the 
journal Psychotherapy, Thompson-Brenner 
(2011) introduced a special section on the role of 
significance testing in clinical trials. The set of 
articles illuminated considerations for providing 
the most accurate information on how best to 
create effective interventions in clinical practice. 
In the leading article, Krause (2011a), discussed 
the limitations of significance testing with 
randomized clinical trials (RCTs) and called for 
the inclusion of whole outcome distributions 
from participants in an RCT. Similar to what 
Cumming (2012) and others promote, Krause 
(2011a, 2011b) maintained that the significance 
test and p-value, alone, are not very informative 
about how to proceed with clinical treatments. 
Gottdiener (2011) responded by advocating the 
use of effect sizes and confidence intervals when 
presenting RCT results and asked researchers to 
supplement these data with information from 
case studies that can more specifically delineate 
treatment effectiveness and failure.  
It is noteworthy that Gottdiener - as 
Wilson (1998) did earlier - also encouraged the 
study of multiple outcomes, arguing that 
multivariate data are more apt to provide bases 
for reliable and valid conclusions regarding 
treatment success or failure. Wise (2011) 
provided a compelling discussion on the need 
for evidence of clinically significant change and 
the use of a reliable change index, which is 
similar to a pre-post-intervention z-score for 
participants in an RCT. Here, the convergence 
and divergence of these proposals with respect 
to views put forth by Rogers, and Robinson and 
Levin, are not as clear-cut, except, again, that 
the former would favor multivariate approaches 
more readily than the latter researchers. 
To round out this discourse on 
significance testing and its supplements, it is of 
note that Hagen (1997, 1998), a strong 
proponent of NHST, also recognized that effect 
sizes and confidence intervals are meaningful to 
report. Further, Hagen - who was reportedly 
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“struck by the beauty, elegance, and usefulness 
of NHST” - went on to acknowledge that “other 
methods of inference may be equally elegant and 
even more useful depending on the question 
being asked” (1998, p. 803). Similarly, whereas 
Burnham and Anderson (2002) admitted that 
“for classic experiments (control-treatment, with 
randomization and replication) we generally 
support the traditional approaches (e.g., analysis 
of variance)” (p. viii), largely based on NHST; 
they more strongly endorsed a modeling 
perspective. Rozin (2009) would probably agree, 
stating that hypothesis testing may be more 
appropriate in fields where there is more 
knowledge and background. Otherwise, Rozin 
recommended assessing the nature of the 
phenomenon and its “generality outside of the 
laboratory and across cultures” (2009, p. 436), a 
practice that may be more easily accomplished 
with modeling. In this regard, it is useful to 
consider an alternative to NHST, namely, 
statistical and mathematical modeling. 
 
Statistical and Mathematical Modeling 
Rodgers (2010a) argued persuasively for 
adopting statistical and mathematical modeling, 
which he claims subsumes the predominant 
standard of NHST. Rodgers convincingly 
expressed the benefits and extent of statistical 
modeling, including such procedures as 
“structural equation modeling, multi-level 
modeling, missing data methods, hierarchical 
linear modeling, categorical data analysis, as 
well as the development of many dedicated and 
specific behavioral models.” Rodgers further 
decried the emphasis in NHST on the rejection 
of a null hypothesis, a practice that, in 
opposition to Rodgers, was embraced by 
Robinson and Levin. However, these latter 
researchers clarify that they view NHST mainly 
as a screening device (Robinson & Levin, 2010) 
to illuminate findings worthy of further study, 
and thus would not be expected to place undue 
attention on the null hypothesis. Still, as 
Rodgers pointed out, statistical modeling places 
the focus on a well-constructed model, as 
opposed to a null hypothesis, and entails a 
“powerful epistemological system” of “building 
and evaluating statistical and scientific models.” 
Rodgers (2010a) further advocated that 
methodological curriculum should be revised to 
incorporate a modeling approach, with NHST 
playing an “an important though not expansive 
role” (p. 1). 
Others would agree with the call for 
wider use of model testing. Burnham and 
Anderson (2002) discussed a multi-model 
approach to understanding and approximating a 
complex process. Their information-theoretic 
approach includes comparing a scientific model 
that has a strong theoretical basis to several 
reasonable alternative models, while also taking 
into account parameter estimation, uncertainty 
and parsimony. In this way, a model or reduced 
set of models can be retained as the “best 
approximating model” (p. 2). Their approach 
represents a balance between over-fitting that 
would be neither replicable nor externally valid, 
and under-fitting which would be limiting and 
lack internal validity. It may seem paradoxical 
that Robinson and Levin would most likely also 
go along with the practice of testing multiple 
models, whereas it could easily be expected that 
Rodgers would approve of Burnham and 
Anderson’s recommended multi-model testing 
methodology. 
In a similar endorsement, Filkin (1997) 
described how Stephen Hawking, a renowned 
physicist, used a method called “sum over 
histories” to select the most likely approaches or 
models to understand a specific phenomenon 
and then to eliminate them one by one until 
arriving at the most probable solution (p. 272). 
Likewise, Maxwell and Delaney (2004) 
presented a convincing and integrative approach 
to science by proposing the examination of 
multiple models within a given study, ideally 
with research based on an experimental design. 
To varying degrees, Robinson and Levin, as well 
as Rodgers, would support this emphasis on 
assessing several viable and relevant models, 
particularly within the context of rigorous, 
controlled research. 
Congruent with Rodgers’ (2010a) focus 
on statistical modeling that recognizes the role 
of significance testing, Granaas (1998) claimed 
that “model fitting combines the NHST ability to 
falsify hypotheses with the parameter estimation 
characteristic of confidence intervals” and could 
still recognize that “effect size estimation is 
central” (p. 800). In an in-depth and convincing 
collection of model-based methods, Little, 
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Bovaird and Card (2007) offered a well-
articulated treatise on the benefits of statistical 
modeling, particularly when taking into account 
various conditions (e.g., mediation, missing 
data, moderation, multilevel data, multiple time 
points). I back each of these efforts, which 
would - at least in part - be supported by 
Robinson and Levin as to the value of NHST, 
considering relevant provisos. I would go further 
to state that statistical modeling may be more 
effective than NHST in allowing and even 
encouraging researchers to be more motivated to 
study, analyze and integrate their findings into 
encompassing and coherent streams of research. 
This position would most assuredly be endorsed 
by Rodgers. 
The capabilities aside, it cannot go 
unnoticed that Robinson and Levin, as well as 
numerous other researchers (e.g., Baumrind, 
1983; Cliff, 1983; Freedman, 1987a, 1987b; 
Ragosa, 1987) spelled out the possible hazards 
of statistical modeling, particularly when 
making unjustifiable causal claims from 
information that does not stem from longitudinal 
data or experimental design with adequate 
controls. Moreover, Kratochwill and Levin 
(2010), as well as Robinson and Levin, 
emphasized the importance of randomization, as 
well as replication and manipulation of the 
independent variable in order to achieve 
experimental control and build causal evidence. 
These authors argued that even single-case 
intervention designs can be made more rigorous 
and allow stronger conclusions, particularly by 
randomizing the assignment, timing and/or 
replication of interventions. 
 
Shared Variance 
Despite the various approaches to 
conducting scientific research, and the 
apparently contended methods of NHST and 
model testing, the articles in this issue by 
Rodgers, and Robinson and Levin could be said 
to agree on a number of practices and 
perspectives, including the merits of 
randomization and replication, and the cautions 
against over-interpreting correlations or using 
causal language when it is not justified. A 
careful reading of the viewpoints put forth by 
these authors, who admittedly come from 
differing epistemological vantages; concur on 
the importance of each of the following: 
 
• Conducting exploratory / preliminary 
research that reveals worthwhile avenues to 
pursue;  
• A strong theoretical framework; 
• The use of randomization; 
• Addressing threats to the validity of 
research; 
• Emphasizing effect sizes and reasonable 
sample-size considerations; 
• Being cautious to not over-interpret 
correlations; 
• Avoiding causal language when not 
justified; 
• Only making meaningful and justified 
conclusions; 
• Encouraging replication; 
• Noting the historical importance and 
development of NHST; 
• Recognizing the value of NHST as part of a 
larger research process; 
• Acknowledging the value of both NHST and 
statistical modeling; 
• Realizing that both NHST and statistical 
modeling can be misused; 
• Not disavowing a statistical procedure just 
because it is sometimes misused; and 
• Accruing ongoing knowledge about 
scientific findings that address relevant 
problems. 
 
By any yardstick, it would be difficult to deny 
significant overlap and agreement in the 
scientific values of Robinson, Levin, and 
Rodgers. 
Just as it would not be accurate to posit 
hypothesis testing as the exclusive focus on a 
dichotomous decision between a null hypothesis 
and a generic alternative hypothesis, there may 
not be the need for a sharp contrast between the 
approaches presented by Rogers, and Robinson 
and Levin. Unlike Schmidt and Hunter (1997) 
who claimed that “statistical significance 
testing…never makes a positive contribution” 
(p. 37), or even McGrath (1998) who ventured 
that “it is very appropriate to praise the 
brilliance of NHST, but having done so, perhaps 
it is time to bury it” (p. 797), a more inclusive 
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approach to science would allow for much of 
what was advocated by Robinson and Levin as 
well as Rodgers. 
Rodgers (2010a) and Robinson and 
Levin, among others (e.g., APA, 2010; 
Wilkinson, et al, 1999), supported a broad and 
accurate approach that incorporates rigorous 
considerations (e.g., effect sizes, confidence 
intervals), alongside either NHST or statistical 
modeling. Hagen (1998), consistent with 
Robinson and Levin, and Rodgers, raised 
another issue by contending that “absence of 
evidence does not equal evidence of absence” 
(p. 803). By this Hagen clarified that research 
that fails to reject a null hypothesis cannot claim 
that the null hypothesis is true, a point that is 
sometimes mistakenly made with proponents of 
both NHST and modeling. In this regard, 
researchers conducting NHST cannot assert 
finding proof for the null hypothesis when it 
fails to be rejected. Similarly, those carrying out 
statistical modeling cannot overstate the benefit 
of a model in which the proposed model was not 
found to be significantly different from the 
pattern of variation and covariation in the data. 
Rogers, Robinson and Levin would undoubtedly 
agree that reasonable alternatives, confounds 
and considerations need ample deliberation, 
regardless of scientific approach. 
 
Significant Differences or Type I Errors? 
Given the recognized points of 
convergence, it is informative to at least mention 
that in this issue, Robinson and Levin, and 
Rodgers set forth differing or detracting points 
of view, as evinced in the following: 
Robinson and Levin believed that 
Rodgers presents “a one-sided view of the 
controversy,” and argue that they “have seen 
frequent misapplication of Rodgers’ favored 
causal modeling techniques.” Robinson and 
Levin further argued against a statistical 
modeling approach, based largely on the 
possible misuses associated with such an 
approach, for example, making unwarranted 
causal conclusions and overly prescriptive 
statements when using cross-sectional and 
correlational data. It is likely that most 
researchers, including Rodgers, would agree 
with their encouragement to use hypothesis 
testing wisely and to supplement with effect 
sizes and confidence intervals. Similarly, 
Rodgers and other researchers are apt to endorse 
their concern with ascribing causality when the 
research design did not include the necessary 
controls (e.g., randomization, manipulation, 
temporal ordering, isolation of effect, 
repetition). 
Whereas Rodgers’ (2010b) claim that 
statistical modeling could serve as a larger 
framework that subsumes NHST could be 
acknowledged, some of the writing may be too 
dismissive. For example, Rodgers charged that 
NHST does not have status and involves 
immature and simple science, compared with an 
epistemological system such as mathematical 
and statistical modeling. It may be more 
accurate to state that NHST can focus on more 
specific research questions, particularly in areas 
in which there is sufficient background 
knowledge to make informed and relevant 
hypotheses (see Rozin, 2009 for more discussion 
on this point). 
Robinson and Levin occasionally made 
statements that may be overstated or inaccurate, 
such as using the qualifier “causal” numerous 
times when referring to modeling procedures or 
advocates, even when the term “causal” was not 
necessarily appropriate or endorsed by what was 
being described. This misattribution of causal 
language is evident in the title of their article, 
when referring to “Rodgers’ favored causal 
modeling techniques,” when speaking about 
“causal modeling techniques” and “unfortunate 
‘causal’ nomenclature, “as well as “causal-
model researchers,” among other instances. 
Robinson and Levin also provided what they 
claimed as examples of “unjustified ‘causal’ 
excerpts” that are said to have overstated the use 
of causal language, when the research they 
describe does not explicitly appear to have done 
so and where, in some cases, the researchers 
have cautioned against making causal 
conclusions. For example, in an article that is 
critiqued, researchers claimed that “the data in 
the study are cross-sectional in nature and causal 
relations cannot be drawn” (Chen, et al, 2009, p. 
304) although Robinson and Levin dismissed the 
stated limitation as “predictable.” 
Rodgers could also offer more 
elaboration and careful language when 
describing relevant examples that would favor 
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modeling research, such as when stating how 
“selection bias has improperly influenced the 
interpretation of birth order-intelligence links,” 
on illustrating a “type of sibling control,” and on 
how “findings make a strong statement about 
both modeling and NHST.” When describing 
each of these examples, there did not appear to 
be enough information provided to come to the 
conclusions that Rodgers set forth. Additionally, 
it would be preferred to use the word “parents” 
instead of “women” when discussing problems 
that are “almost completely attributable to the 
type of women who put their children in day 
care.” 
Regarding the use of language, 
Robinson and Levin occasionally used glib or 
dismissive terms when describing “the perceived 
magical quality of SEM allowing researchers to 
coax causality from correlational data,” or 
referring to “grand prescriptives” in published 
conclusions. Moreover, these authors chided that 
cross-sectional and correlational data are “tossed 
into a statistical modeling analysis and what 
‘popped out’ were causal conclusions”, and 
allude to Rodgers’ “seductive subtitle” that 
could purportedly “cause” researchers to see 
modeling as “methodological randomization 
compensating panaceas.” 
Another point worth noting is that 
Robinson and Levin, as well as Rodgers, 
expressed concern about the nature of the 
articles cited and, conversely, omitted from their 
respective manuscripts, when almost half of the 
citations in each manuscript involve one or more 
of the corresponding authors (i.e., 11 of 24 
references are self-citations in Rodgers; and 14 
of 33 references in Robinson & Levin similarly 
involve one or both of the authors). Whereas it is 
not unusual to cite relevant articles with which 
one is familiar, there may be some degree of 
selection bias in what is referenced in both 
manuscripts. 
Are these points indicative of significant 
differences between Rodgers, and Robinson and 
Levin, or possibly just Type I errors in some 
cases? The reader may best decide. 
 
Reconciling Different Approaches to Scientific 
Inference 
Is it possible to come to agreement on 
how to approach scientific research? As Simon 
(1969) and Kaku (2009) expounded, whereas the 
world around us appears complex and 
unknowable, the role of scientists is to use 
whatever means are available to see through to 
the essence or set of truths in a field. These 
efforts will most likely involve thoughtful 
theoretical frameworks alongside sophisticated 
quantitative analysis to uncover what is not 
easily distinguished on the surface, positions that 
many scientists, including Rodgers, Robinson 
and Levin would endorse. Without specifying a 
precise approach, Devlin, a mathematician, 
writes that “where the real world is concerned, 
we have to go out and collect data. We enter the 
world of statistics” (1998, p. 156). Lakoff & 
Núñez (2000) affirmed that “mathematics is a 
magnificent example of the beauty, richness, 
complexity, diversity, and importance of human 
ideas” (p. 379), and Galton (1889) eloquently 
spoke of the wonder of statistics when used 
judiciously, stating: 
 
Some people hate the very name of 
statistics, but I find them full of beauty 
and interest. Whenever they are not 
brutalised, but delicately handled by the 
higher methods, and are warily 
interpreted, their power of dealing with 
complicated phenomena is 
extraordinary. They are the only tools by 
which an opening can be cut through the 
formidable thicket of difficulties that 
bars the path of those who pursue … 
Science. (p. 62-63) 
 
Advocates of both NHST and statistical 
modeling would most likely agree with Galton 
on the overriding splendor of quantitative 
methods when used responsibly, regardless of 
the particular approach to scientific research. 
Hayes (2011) maintained that scientists 
may fare well when using statistical, 
probabilistic models. He argued that, in contrast 
to using a strictly deductive process and seeking 
deterministic principals, it is preferable to 
actively engage with the data by “forming and 
evaluating hypotheses, building conceptual 
models, and applying iterative procedures to 
refine the models or replace them when 
necessary” (p. 421). This description aptly 
depicts what Rodgers advocated with statistical 
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modeling, and incorporates what Robinson and 
Levin encourage with testing hypotheses with 
randomized experiments “followed by a 
sufficient number of independent replications 
until the researcher has confidence that the 
initially observed effect is a statistically reliable 
one.” 
When considering the overall value of 
hypothesis testing and modeling, Rodgers 
(2010b) acclaimed that “NHST is a worthy, 
valuable, and useful tool” and “is still a proper 
paradigm, but it is a special case of a broader 
and thus more flexible paradigm.” Hagen (1998) 
also acknowledged, along with Granaas (1998), 
that statistical modeling may well have 
advantages over NHST, although knowledge 
and use of modeling may not be as widely 
available as NHST, a position endorsed by 
Rodgers, as well. Certainly, the longer history of 
NHST as adopted in classrooms and research 
labs, has found its way into books and scholarly 
articles in larger volume than that of statistical 
and mathematical modeling procedures. It could 
only facilitate the progression of scientific 
knowledge to encourage more attention to well-
tempered modeling to complement the pervasive 
availability and use of significance testing. 
Ultimately, creative science depends on 
the ability to conduct specifically-focused, 
controlled studies that involve randomization 
and allow for causal inference. At the same time, 
there is a need for more broad-based and 
overarching statistical modeling that allows 
more flexible hypothesizing, analyzing and 
synthesizing of relationships among multiple 
relevant variables. There need not be an artificial 
dichotomy between these approaches to 
scientific research. Indeed, Rodgers (2010b) 
recognized that hypothesis testing and modeling 
“can be reconciled and accommodated” (p. 340). 
As long as researchers keep in mind 
what can and cannot be claimed on the basis of 
their particular studies, the adoption of multiple 
approaches can only enhance and further the 
realm of science. A new journal is now 
available, the Journal of Causal Inference, 
edited by Judea Pearl and others, to encourage a 
rigorous multidisciplinary exchange of ideas 
regarding causation in scientific research. It is 
hypothesized that ongoing and open dialogue 
among foremost scientific researchers will help 
clarify the value of maintaining controlled and 
specific NHST, as well as revolutionary and 
overarching statistical modeling. 
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